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Abstract
The issue of the definition and position of archaeology as a discipline
is examined in relation to the dispute which took place from 1980 to
2009 between the archaeologist Jean-Claude Gardin and the sociolo-
gist Jean-Claude Passeron. This case study enables us to explore the
actual conceptual relationships between archaeology and the other sci-
ences (as opposed to those wished for or prescribed). The contrasts
between the positions declared by the two researchers and the root-
ing of their arguments in their disciplines are examined: where the
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sociologist makes use of his philosophical training, the archaeologist
relies mainly on his work on semiology and informatics. Archaeol-
ogy ultimately plays a minor role in the arguments proposed. This
dispute therefore cannot be considered as evidence for the movement
of concepts between archaeology and the social sciences. A blind spot
in the debate, relating to the ontological specificities of archaeological
objects, nevertheless presents itself as a possible way of implementing
this movement.
Key words: Theoretical archaeology, epistemology of social science,
scientific dispute, Ehess.
Since it was founded in 1975, the École des hautes études en sciences so-
ciales (Ehess) has regularly organised “discussion days”, aimed at bringing
together its various component disciplines around a single research ques-
tion. Archaeology has featured among these disciplines since the creation,
in 1960, of a directeur d’études (research director) chair at the École pratique
des hautes études (Ephe; the Ehess was established in 1975, by splitting from
the Ephe). This was created for Paul Courbin (1922–1994), a Hellenistic ar-
chaeologist who, in 1967, founded and ran a research department focused
on archaeological methods, within the Ephe (Darcque 1996, p. 319). In 1987,
the discussion days at the Ehess focused on the “Problems and objectives of
social science research” and took place in Marseille (5 and 6 June) and Mon-
trouge (12 and 13 June). Having read the programme of papers, Courbin
decided to write to the president of the École, Marc Augé: he wished to
bring to his attention that “1. Archaeology, a social science if ever there was
one, did not feature at all. 2. It was nevertheless present everywhere” (Cour-
bin 1987, p. 54). Having gone into some detail about the reasons for this
apparent paradox, Courbin expressed his wish that “archaeology not be for-
gotten amongst all the prestigious and abundantly represented disciplines
which are the pride of the École”. As a field archaeologist, and involved in
an excavation, Courbin was unable to take part in these meetings, except
through this letter. The situation was the same for one of the few other
archaeologists in the École, Jean-Claude Gardin (1925–2013).
The above reference to the 1987 meetings illustrates the difficulties re-
garding the integration of archaeology into the social sciences, even in an
institution which is specifically dedicated to them, such as the Ehess. This
can be measured by both the limited numbers of archaeologists, and the
equally tenuous position held by their specific knowledge and concepts. To
state the existence of a particular kind of science, such as the social sciences,
and to then claim the inclusion of archaeology among these is one thing;
to examine the nature of the actual established (or, on the contrary, absent)
relationships between these sciences is another. In this article, I hope to con-
tribute to the second perspective. The reader may point out that the subject
is not new, that today it is firmly accepted that archaeology is a social sci-
ence (André Leroi-Gourhan is one of the authority figures regularly cited in
this regard) and that much work has already been done on the connections
between archaeology and ethnology, archaeology and history etc.: the work
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of Alain Testart and others evenmore specific can bementioned here (Gallay
2011; Latour and Lemonnier 1994). Furthermore, this list could be expanded
considerably by taking into account non-francophone literature. Can we be
sure, however, that we are dealing with descriptions of these relationships
between disciplines and not prescriptions of what they should be? This is
far from certain, and the juxtaposition of disciplines regularly appears to be
the most frequent relational operator.
So as not to resign ourselves too quickly to the idea that such juxtaposi-
tion is the only possible method, I will examine a dispute which presented
the most favourable conditions for real conceptual movement. This argu-
ment saw two researchers from the Ehess oppose each other: the archaeol-
ogist Jean-Claude Gardin and the sociologist Jean-Claude Passeron (1930–).
Two factors make their dispute a particularly favourable case. Firstly, both
researchers brought together, in their respective disciplines, considerable ex-
perience in empirical research and reflexive skill. Secondly, their disagree-
ment was specifically in relation to the nature and the expression of reason-
ing in the sciences which study humans, as well as to the positions held by
these disciplines within science as a whole. While Passeron supported the
idea of an epistemological specificity among sciences which he grouped into
the category of “historical sciences” (the core of which is made up of soci-
ology, history and anthropology), Gardin refuted this. It should be noted
that their dispute fits into wider contemporary debates across the social sci-
ences and the humanities, both between various fields, within particular dis-
ciplines.
In archaeology, Gardin confronted the movement known as “post pro-
cessual” (or “interpretive”) archaeology which developed in particular in
Great Britain as archaeologists assimilated certain “post-modern” ideas and
rejected the earlier propositions of the New (or processual) archaeology.
Gardin explored some of the work of Ian Hodder (1948–), whowas the leader
of the movement (Gardin 1987b), and later commented on the development
of these debates (Gardin 1999, p. 124, Gardin 2009b, pp. 179–178). During
the 1990s, the challenging of the criteria of scientificity in archaeology led
him to amore general critique of the idea of the epistemological “ThirdWay”.
This supposes the existence of a means of producing knowledge – and, as
a result, of a type of knowledge – which is simultaneously distinct from lit-
erature and from the so-called “hard” sciences. This denomination refers
to the distinction popularised by Wolf Lepenies (1941–) between the “three
cultures”, which correspond with the three types of knowledge mentioned
above (Lepenies 1988). In the Gardin collection of the Strasbourg National
University Library (currently being catalogued), the documents collected in
the folder entitled “Third Way” attest to this interest. For Gardin, the posi-
tions defended by Passeron constitute a francophone example of this more
general trend (Gardin 1995, p. 23). Conversely, Passeron presents the work
of his rival as an example of scientific positivism which defends the illusion
of the unified nature of the sciences, a positivism exemplified by the theo-
ries of the philosopher Karl Popper. Passeron, by contrast, defends a middle
ground based on a double criticism aimed, on the one hand, at ambitions
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(promoted by Gardin, in particular) to formalise reasoning and, on the other
hand (though this time in line with Gardin), at the most radical forms of
linguistic reductionism. As such, Passeron clearly distances himself from
work conveniently grouped under the label of the linguistic turn, such as
that of Hayden White, for whom history could be assimilated to tropology,
the abstract science of symbols (Passeron, Moulin, et al. 1996, pp. 299–300).
The dispute, focused principally on the possibility of differentiating types
of scientific reasoning, is thus a potential example of confrontation, and
therefore exchange, between archaeology and the “human sciences”. I will
examine it using a very simple question: what in this dispute was strictly “ar-
chaeological”? How is archaeology involved, whether by the introduction
of knowledge or by its conceptual frameworks? Is this dialogue, between a
sociologist and epistemologist of the “historical sciences”, and an archaeol-
ogist and proponent of a “practical epistemology”, an example of the actual
inclusion of archaeology in the conceptual network of the social sciences?
In short, will this dispute reveal a discrepancy in the accusation of reclusion
which is often levelled against archaeology in France (Audouze and Leroi-
Gourhan 1981; Guerreau 2001, pp. 142–143; Dufal 2010)?
Firstly, I will summarise the chronological and spatial dimensions of the
dispute. Although the two authors were respectively a sociologist and an ar-
chaeologist, I will demonstrate secondly that the issue which brought them
into conflict in fact stems from an issue related to the philosophy of science.
I will then go on to show that the authors approached this issue first and
foremost in its epistemological dimension, to the detriment of the ontolog-
ical aspects. Finally, by exploring the authors’ use of empirical examples,
archaeological concepts and the ontological properties of the data analysed
in this science, I will highlight the ultimately tenuous role played by archae-
ology in this debate.
1 From the analysis of discourse to the epistemology
of social science
1.1 Chronology of the dispute
During the 1960s, Gardin conducted several research projects relating to
the automation of non-digital information. His first contribution to this
field dates from 1958, with his paper “On the coding of geometrical shapes
and other representations, with reference to archaeological documents”, pre-
sented at the International Conference on Scientific Information in Wash-
ington, a milestone in the history of the automation of documentation
(Gardin 1959). Of the 232 publications of Gardin’s that I inventoried, 33
deal specifically with documentation issues, most of which were published
in specialised volumes. I have not included the 75 publications about the
application of documentation in a specific field, predominantly archaeology.
From 1960 to 1971, Gardin directed the Centre d’analyse documentaire pour
l’archéologie (Cada), based initially in Paris (1962–1964) and later on the
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Cnrs campus in Marseille (1964–1971). Alongside this, from 1960 to 1966,
he also directed the Section d’automatique documentaire (Sad) of the Insti-
tut Blaise Pascal, located in Paris, 23 rue du Maroc. From 1971, he decided to
concentrate on his archaeological research in Afghanistan. In 1974, he never-
theless published a collection entitled Les analyses de discours (Gardin 1974).
This book fed the debate which put him in opposition to other practitioners
of this type of analysis, such as Michel Pêcheux (1938–1983), although he is
not mentioned explicitly (on this subject, see Léon 2015, pp. 144–148).
A few years later, Passeron presented an initial wording of his general
epistemology of the historical sciences in his thèse d’État (a work in which
he brings togethermore than twenty years of research), Lesmots de la sociolo-
gie (Passeron 1980). Here he discusses “illusory [methodological] solutions”,
and dedicates a chapter to the “artificial paradise of formalism”. His criti-
cisms are especially aimed at certain aspirations of automation in discourse
analysis, a domain populated mainly by sociologists, psycho-sociologists
and mathematicians. He mentions Gardin’s work and takes up a number
of criticisms presented by him (Passeron 1980, pp. 139–141). He adopts in
particular the “relevance tests” prescribed by Gardin (Gardin 1970, p. 648),
aimed at measuring the “differentiating capability of the categories used to
‘describe’ the texts” (Gardin 1974, p. 21) and which Gardin saw as safeguards
against a complete removal of responsibility on the part of the analyst, in
favour of the machine.
In 1991, Passeron published a reworked version of his thèse d’État un-
der the title Le raisonnement sociologique. L’espace non-poppérien du raison-
nement naturel (Passeron 1991; translator’s note: as this book has never
been translated into English, all quotations have been translated specifically
for this paper). In the “Propositions récapitulatives” (summary propositions)
which conclude this work, the author posits that “sociological reasoning”
constitutes an alternative form of scientific rationality, common to all “his-
torical” sciences. Gardin’s “logicist” works are explicitly challenged, not in
relation to the analysis of discourse, but in terms of the general epistemol-
ogy of the humanities. This is particularly true of the chapter “Les contrôles
illusoires” (illusory controls) (p. 158) and, especially, in the “Propositions ré-
capitulatives” (p. 373). Here, Passeron targets a collective volume edited
by Gardin, Systèmes experts et sciences humaines. Le cas de l’archéologie
(Gardin et al. 1987). Gardin was subsequently invited by the editors of the
European Journal of Sociology to write a review of Le raisonnement soci-
ologique. This meticulously critical piece was initially published under the
title “Les embarras du naturel” (“The discomforts of the natural”) (Gardin
1993) and then republished three years later byArianeMiéville andGiovanni
Busino, on the occasion of a special edition of the Revue européenne des sci-
ences sociales, entitled “Pavane pour Jean-Claude Passeron” (“A Tribute to
Jean-Claude Passeron”: Gardin 1996). In later articles, Passeron responded
to his various critics (including Gardin, though he does not mention him
specifically): “Logique et schématique dans l’argumentation des sciences so-
ciales” (Passeron 1997), “Logique formelle, rhétorique et schématisme” (Passe-
ron 2002), and even clarifies his arguments against “logicism” in general, in
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“Le cas et la preuve. Raisonner à partir de singularités” (Passeron and Revel
2005, pp. 31–40). Later, Gardin summarised and included this dispute in a
synopsis of the evolution of his own work since the 1950s, while remark-
ing in passing that Passeron and his various co-authors had successively
defended varying positions on the modes of reasoning which belong to the
social sciences (Gardin 2009b, pp. 174–175).
1.2 The contexts of the debate in Marseille and Paris
In addition to the publications, certain places also played a part in the dis-
pute. Marseille and Paris are of particular interest in this regard. In the early
1970s, Gardin left Marseille and the direction of Cada, and returned to Paris
to oversee the launch of the new Centre de recherches archéologiques (Cra)
which he had largely helped to create. In 1982, Passeron was elected as a
directeur d’études at the Ehess, with a chair entitled “sociology of arts and
culture”. In keeping with the decentralisation taking place within the Ehess,
he moved to Marseille and founded the “Centre d’études et de recherches sur
la culture, la communication, les modes de vie et la socialisation” (Cercom,
located in La Vieille Charité), in addition to the journal Enquête. This labo-
ratory contributed to the renewal of the dynamism in social science in Mar-
seille during the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1990s, a meeting between Passeron
and Gardin was organised there on the initiative of André Tchernia (1936–).
A directeur d’études at the Ehess and a specialist in Classical and sub-aquatic
archaeology, Tchernia was also interested in formal approaches in archae-
ology, which he had practised during collaborations with Gardin and re-
searchers from Cada (École française de Rome, 1977). Furthermore, the de-
bate between Gardin and Passeron also continued during seminars: those of
the “Raison et rationalités” (reason and rationalities) group, run by Giovanni
Busino (1929–) (Passeron 1997) and, in particular, one called “Le modèle et
le récit” (the model and the narrative), which took place at the Maison des
Sciences de l’Homme in Paris, between 1995 and 1999 (Gardin 2001; Passeron
2001). During each of these meetings, the debates focused on the general
epistemology of scientific knowledge relating to humans.
2 A philosophy of science issue
2.1 An ambivalent distancing of philosophy
Since the debate was epistemological, both authors found themselves in a
domain which was, in theory, neither that of the sociologist nor that of the
archaeologist. How did they situate themselves in relation to what appears
to be a transgression of their legitimate fields of activity? This point is of
importance: it directly concerns the distribution of legitimacy regarding the
metadiscourse relating to a science. This legitimacy is claimed by the his-
torians and sociologists of science, who have a troubled relationship with
philosophers and their older prerogatives in this domain (Shapin 1992).
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In this regard, both authors claim the same detachment from philosophy.
Passeron, who trained at the École Normale Supérieure on rue d’Ulm in Paris,
like other sociologists or anthropologists of his generation, thus claims a de-
tachment from the discipline which had been at the heart of his education.
Nevertheless, as was already the case in the work he carried out in collabora-
tionwith Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002), his practice of sociology contained an
underlying philosophical element. This ambivalence has at times been high-
lighted as being part of Passeron’s style. In Le raisonnement sociologique, it
initially manifests itself by the explicit denial of any philosophical influence:
“[…] I explained [during an interview], though without any
great hope of being believed, that my epistemological reflections
were born directly of my perplexities as an investigative sociolo-
gist, and not of any nostalgia for the distant philosophical stud-
ies of my youth” (Passeron 2006, p. 20; see also aussi Passeron,
Moulin, et al. 1996, pp. 275–279.)
In spite of this, Passeron’s texts display a certain number of traits typical
of philosophical writing: abundant references to philosophical authors and
publications, as well as the use ofmore geometrico reasoning, through propo-
sitions and corollaries. This mode of presentation, of which Spinoza’s Ethics
is the paradigmatic example, is particularly obvious in the “Propositions ré-
capitulatives” of Le raisonnement sociologique. In the book’s index, one ob-
serves the names of Karl Popper, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gaston Bachelard,
Gottlob Frege, Saul Kripke (Passeron 2006, pp. 662–666). In short, philoso-
phy, pushed out the door by a criticism of biographical determinism, comes
back through the window, in the methods of writing and of presenting ar-
guments.
As for Gardin’s texts, references to works of philosophy of science are, if
not absent, quite sporadic: in the article “Les embarras du naturel”, there is
only one reference, to Bertrand Russell (Gardin 1993, p. 162). And while else-
where hemay havementioned Nelson Goodman or Daniel Dennett, this was
precisely to provide contrast to the objectives of the “practical epistemology”
which he defends (Gardin 1987a, pp. 245–246). Gardin also differentiates his
approach from those developed in logic and in psychology. If he mentions
the logic of Gottlob Frege (Gardin 1980, p. 15) or the logicism of Charles
Morris and of the Vienna Circle (Gardin 2003, p. 8, Gardin 2009b, p. 170), it
is to emphasise the tenuous links which tie them to his own sense of logi-
cism. More generally, the rare positive references to philosophical work can
be summarised in the mention – recurrent and unchanging – of the “field-
related logics” of Stephen Toulmin (Gardin 2003, p. 8, Gardin 2009b, p. 170:
see Gardin 1987c, p. 195, Gardin 1997b), the “crude uniformities” of Bertrand
Russell (Russell 1918, p. 118: see Gardin 1991, p. 96, Gardin 1993, p. 162, Gar-
din 1995, p. 20) or, potentially, reference to the works of Roy Howard or
Karl Popper (Gardin 1987a, p. 255; Gardin 1999, p. 121). In fact, Gardin be-
gins his 1993 critique by introducing himself exclusively as an archaeologist
and takes care to deny any skill in sociology:
“What should be understood in the world of scientific research
7
when we say that reasoning is natural? This question has in-
trigued me for a long time. It is asked in my field, archaeology,
as well as in sociology […] because one could be justifiably sur-
prised that my knowledge, restricted to the archaeology of cen-
tral Asia, would enable me to give an opinion on works focusing
on the ‘teaching system, cultural diffusion and the reception of
works of art’ gathered in this anthology.” (Gardin 1993, p. 152).
A rejection of philosophy and an assertion of a rootedness in their field:
despite this double gesture, common to both authors, the dispute ended up
shifting to the terrain of philosophy of science and moves away from the
practical concerns of the inquiry, be it sociological or archaeological.
2.2 Data and procedures of knowledge in analysing science
The issue at the heart of the dispute was in relation to the possibility of
distinguishing between types of reasoning and, more specifically, the char-
acterisation of the “natural” reasoning which was of particular importance
to Passeron. In addition, the debate explored the conditions of possibility,
in the humanities, of the “deindexation” of concepts in relation to their his-
torical context. In other words, must we necessarily analyse these modes of
scientific reasoning in a historical way, that is, by relating them to the con-
texts of their production and pronouncement (in science as a whole, and in
the “human sciences”)? If the “deindexation” in question is possible, another
issue arises, in knowing to what degree this may be applied. The solution
to this problem determines the possibility of formalising utterances in the
humanities: indeed, this deindexation is a prerequisite of any attempt at
formalised abstraction of an utterance or its component concepts. Where
Gardin argued for the possibility of formalising utterances to a certain de-
gree, Passeron, in contrast, maintained that historical reasoning contains
properties which prohibit this “deindexation”, and ultimately, therefore, any
formalisation.
Gardin considered reasoning and the degree of generality in the definition
of objects to be two separate things. The level of generality necessary for
defining types – and the criteria which determine whether they can be asso-
ciated with empirical data – varies according to the type of phenomena ob-
served (material, social). Nevertheless, the modes of reasoning are the same
in natural science and in historical science. With reference to the Big Bang,
he adds that hapax legomena – the most extreme form of uniqueness of a
phenomenon, and therefore the most difficult to classify – are not specific to
human phenomena (Gardin 1993, p. 158; this argument also features in Gar-
din 2009b, p. 174). However, Gardin does not go into more detail about what
varies, or about the categories into which fall archaeological data (material,
mental, social?). Thus, both authors’ divergence on the (epistemological) is-
sue of reasoning coincides with a common undervaluing of the ontological
aspects, that is, the properties relating to the very existence of the realities
being considered.
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2.3 Undervaluing of the ontological aspects
The wavering, between an ontological and an epistemological approach,
which is present in Passeron’s Le raisonnement sociologique, remains, for the
anthropologist Gérard Lenclud, an “unresolved issue”. Concerned by this
indecision, Lenclud nevertheless emphasises that, fundamentally, Passeron
appears to construct his epistemology of the “historical” sciences on an onto-
logical theory: the inherent uniqueness of human facts (Lenclud 2001, p. 453).
He notes that on this basis, the author’s theoretical construction remains
nevertheless predominantly attached to the epistemological aspects, relating
to reasoning. Elsewhere, in noting this shortcoming, Lenclud lamented that
the distinction introduced by Passeron between “synoptic social sciences”
(history, anthropology, sociology) and “specific social sciences” (linguistics,
economics, demography) was not based on a joint analysis of their ontolog-
ical and epistemological specificities (Lenclud 1991, p. 265).
In this regard, the priority given by Passeron to epistemology over ontol-
ogy may help to explain why archaeology was not taken into consideration
in Le raisonnement sociologique. Another reason for this omission can most
likely be found in the general absence, in France, of archaeologists in inter-
disciplinary debates in social science, as illustrated by Courbin’s letter, men-
tioned in the introduction. Under these circumstances, it is true that Gardin
himself extended Passeron’s theories to include archaeology, which the for-
mer included by default among the “historical disciplines”. Nevertheless, as
we will see, consideration of the ontological aspects, particularly in relation
to archaeology, would not take place without further perturbing definitions
of the various social sciences, their objects and their relations.
3 Archaeology: mute, absent
3.1 The discomfort of archaeological facts
Although the archaeological object was not treated as such by Passeron, he
nevertheless provided a number of elements which could be applied to it,
when he defined the “empirical world” in his “Propositions et scolies” (propo-
sitions and corollaries):
“Set of observable occurrences: all that is observable, nothing
that is not. It goes without saying that vestiges, in so far as
they constitute directly observable occurrences, permit, through
use of presumptive reasoningwhich sometimes attains certitude,
the reconstruction of a larger field, that of indirect observation:
in the restricted meaning of the word ‘history’, the procedures
of this presumptive reasoning make up the ‘historical method’”
(Passeron 1991, pp. 398–399).
The vestige encompasses indifferently of all that which lasts through time
and which enables, by direct observation of it, the indirect observation of
9
past states of the entity in question. No difference is made between a tex-
tual or non-textual vestige: history and archaeology are thus presented on
a single plane. This is also the case in Gardin’s work.
It would be a mistake to consider that Gardin had a “naive” relationship
with the archaeological object, as evidenced by his particularly precocious
critique of the application of multidimensional statistical analysis in archae-
ology, when these are employed in a way that is indifferent to the nature of
the archaeological entities (Gardin 1965). He did not, however, develop his
reflections on this subject much further. In his later works he certainly deals
with ontology, but more in relation to themeaning of the term in informatics
than in philosophy, whereby the distinction between an archaeological fact
and a social or historical one would be studied (Gardin 2009b, pp. 182–183).
Moreover, as his work on Asia demonstrates, for Gardin, archaeology’s ob-
jective is to produce knowledge about the past states of collective human
entities:
“[…] archaeology, as a form of history, based on material re-
mains instead of or in addition to textual sources.” (Gardin 1987a,
p. 235).
Archaeology is therefore no different from history, and for this reason, he
extended the range of Passeron’s theories to include archaeology (Gardin
2002, p. 22)… even though Passeron had in fact avoided doing so (though
for reasons which remain unclear). It is therefore not surprising that in this
dispute the ontological aspects did not constitute an argumentative resource
for Gardin.
After being surprised at the absence of detailed analyses of the status of
language during the debates of the “Le modèle et le récit” seminar, Gardin
asks: “Does my field play a different game, impracticable in sociology or in
any other social science?” (Gardin 2001, p. 469). The equating of archaeol-
ogy with history and sociology, taken as a given, despite their respective
objects not being discussed or compared, has a tendency to – justifiably –
cause surprise. If archaeology constitutes a counterexample to Passeron’s
theories, as Gardin would have it, to what extent is this due to the nature
of the realities studied by this science and, in particular, to the central yet
distinct status of language within it? Gardin does not provide a response to
the question: archaeology’s inclusion in the social sciences is a blind spot
in his position. The focus is on the procedures which enable reasoning to
be carried out, since the aims are taken as non-problematic. In sociology,
language is always available to define objects (we can conduct an inquiry
into suicide while ignoring the discourses, but it is always possible to repeat
it and include them). On the contrary, in archaeology, the analytic proce-
dures focus on the non-discursive properties of archaeological objects (if
these have discursive properties, they are processed using methods for the
criticism of historical, epigraphic or philological sources). It should also be
noted that in informatics and the automation of documentation, language
itself is the object of study: a language that is, however, heavily controlled
and defined, even if just by writing. In this regard, it is noteworthy that Les
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analyses de discours discusses arguments expressed solely in textual form
(Gardin 1974).
Thus, if archaeology is a “human science”, then Gardin’s interest is more
focused on the second term in the expression (science) than the first (the
unique nature of the human as an object of knowledge). As a result, the lack
of weight behind the archaeological examples in his discussion of Passeron’s
theories should not be surprising.
3.2 The use of archaeological examples
Unlike Karl Popper, who limited his use of examples to a method of refut-
ing statements, Passeron favourably envisaged their usage as the principal
probative method in historical science (Passeron 1991, pp. 289–290). Gardin,
though he did not specifically take a position on this point, made several
uses of the example of archaeology to back up his propositions. Let us ex-
amine the position of these examples in his argument. I wish to make clear
that I have deliberately omitted mentions of archaeology when in relation
to the analysis of texts and not of archaeological facts (for example in Gar-
din 1999). In a text published in 2002, Gardin recalled the reservations he
had expressed in his 1993 article. These had, he said, “their source in the
counterexamples that the long history of archaeological research provides
in abundance” (Gardin 2002, p. 22). Interestingly, it turns out that the text in
question contains a very limited number of archaeological examples: there
are only two, and their development is limited. These examples are revis-
ited, in somewhat greater depth, in his contribution to the Le modèle et le
récit seminar (Gardin 2001, p. 467). Gardin believed he had found in archae-
ology two counterexamples to Passeron’s principal theories: the one stating
the absence of knowledge cumulability in historical science (proposition 2.1,
Passeron 1991, p. 364) and the one supporting the impossibility of conduct-
ing experimental and predictive reasoning.
Against the theory of an impossible cumulability, Gardin offers the ex-
ample of history and prehistory. The observation of new data regularly in-
validates theories. New theories will, in turn, be invalidated, but “[…] this
widening of the empirical bases of our constructions is nonetheless a cumu-
lative process.” (Gardin 1993, p. 155). For history, he gives the example of
the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls, knowledge of which was added to
what was already known of the origins of Christianity. For archaeology, he
refers to the evolution of theories on anthropogenesis (Gardin 1993, pp. 158–
159) and palaeobotany, which has increased our knowledge of the origins of
agriculture (Gardin 1993, p. 155). In a later text, he underlines the temporal
specificity of the archaeological mode of inquiry:
“On the long time scale which is inherent to archaeology, it ap-
pears that ‘reality’, in the relative and temporary sense of the
term defined above, eventually wins out over the cultural biases
we are subject to […]” (Gardin 2009a, p. 27.)
As such, archaeology illustrates, according to Gardin, that it is possible to
both produce stabilised knowledge about human phenomena, and to revise
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it, to improve it, by taking into account new empirical data (see also Gardin
2001, p. 467). Aswe can see, the archaeological and historical examples stand
alongside each other, ultimately with no differences being envisaged.
A second of Passeron’s arguments rejects the possibility of an experi-
mental approach in the humanities: the uniqueness and variability of the
phenomena prohibits the making of “all other things being equal” compar-
isons. As a result, it is impossible to evaluate the “relative validity of con-
current theories”. Gardin objected that one can read the clause “all other
things being equal” in two ways: in theory, he agreed with Passeron that
nothing allows us to state that we “reason in an ‘unchanging context’”; nev-
ertheless, in practice, and “until proven otherwise” this is possible (Gardin
1993, p. 156). Indeed, how does one explain the predictive effectiveness of
certain archaeological theories – no specific example is given in the 1993
text – if it is impossible to experiment (that is, isolate variables and identify
the stable and regular relationships between them, all things being equal)?
Gardin thus admitted the possibility of distinctions and local generalisations,
stabilised in “field-related logics” (as developed by Toulmin). He later recog-
nised, and added to this, two archaeological procedures which he identified
as experimental approaches: the “directed observation”, which we practise
during field survey or when digging test trenches based on the presumption
that they will (in)validate a proposition, and the making of “useful fakes”,
such as flint knapped by archaeologists or reference examples of pottery ty-
pologies, which provide a standard that enables differences to be measured
(Gardin 2001, p. 468 and 470 respectively).
This means of weakening, by virtue of pragmatic criteria, the logical re-
quirements which weigh upon reasoning was a frequent motive for the po-
sitions defended by Gardin. Thus, the simulation of reasoning requires that
one proceeds “as if” the discursive practices counted as a local expression of
more general rules of reasoning (Gardin 1997a, p. 52; Gardin 1999, p. 121).
Gardin put forward that the logicist approach:
“[…] consists of ‘doing as if’ the majority of the theories about
a given subject was an unresolved problem, an intellectual chal-
lenge to be overcome, rather than an unavoidable phenomenon,
or even desirable, not something to be concerned about, in any
case.” (Gardin 2001, p. 472.)
Passeron aimed his criticism directly at this use of the hypothetical, even
though simulation is used indirectly here, to simulate, not the phenomena
themselves, but the conditions of possibility for simulations formed by the
theories (Gardin 1996b: 196). Passeron’s determined rejection of what could
be seen as a limited andmodest ambition appears to betray his attachment to
another “contrôle illusoire” (“illusory control”), which is missing from the in-
ventory that he had established: an over-assessment of the probative nature
of historical indexation on the value of propositions in social science.
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3.3 The epistemological deficiency of archaeological concepts
A third and final element of the potential integration of archaeology in the
dispute concerns not the data processed in archaeology, but the concepts
which are developed and used within it. From this viewpoint, Gardin and
Passeron were unable to make use of the resources produced by their respec-
tive disciplines in the same way.
Regarding sociology, it is quite possible (and debatable) to connect some
arguments which are sociological in nature, and others which are epistemo-
logical in nature. It is interesting to note that in Le raisonnement sociologique,
Passeron distanced himself from one of his earlier publications, Le métier de
sociologue, co-written in 1967 with Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Cham-
boredon. In this work the authors took on the challenge of building an epis-
temology of sociology based on a reflexive sociology of this discipline (Pas-
seron, Moulin, et al. 1996, p. 322). Gardin disagreed with Passeron’s use of
sociological explanations. In relation to the function of “special languages”
(i.e. those specific to a scientific field), Gardin accused him of having reduced
their function to one of differentiation and social justification of expertise:
“The position of specialist that is given to us would, it is true, be
in danger of becoming clouded if we did not have the possibil-
ity of using special languages […]; but the principal function of
these is – one hopes – not simply to differentiate us. A theoreti-
cal descriptive language’s raison d’être is, after all, to express or
to establish a theory.” (Gardin 1993, p. 163 ¹.)
The combination of epistemological and archaeological analyses appears
much less obvious than it actually is, in the case of sociology. Firstly, this is
because, while specifically archaeological concepts may exist (such as nega-
tive contexts or certain taphonomic processes) – and this remains a subject
of debate – it is difficult to imagine the way in which these could inform
an epistemological analysis. Indeed, an “archaeology” of knowledge sup-
poses that these concepts may be used to analyse the creation and spread of
knowledge as is the case with concepts defined by sociologists or psychol-
ogists (metaphoric uses of archaeology, including the one popularised by
Michel Foucault, are irrelevant here, since they do not make use of concepts
belonging to archaeology as it is conducted by archaeologists). Secondly, if
such archaeological concepts exist, they are relative to the description of the
data. The operations which render these events intelligible in archaeologi-
cal reasoning are themselves carried out with the help of concepts borrowed
from ethnology, sociology and even primatology and biology. Thus, in the
absence of (real or relevant) archaeological concepts, Gardin was forced to
¹Gardin later revisited this argument, but this time conceding both the epistemological
and sociological reasons for demarcating scientific languages (Gardin 1997a, p. 53). Else-
where, he distinguished between the sociological and psychological factors supporting the
choice of an epistemological option (Gardin 2001, p. 466 and 474 respectively). While he ad-
mitted that non-epistemological factors could be relevant to our ability to understand short
sequences in the history of science, he denied their pertinence to its long term evolution
(Gardin 1999, p. 122; Gardin 2009a, p. 27).
13
look elsewhere for an analytical repertoire capable of informing the epis-
temological analysis: specifically, to linguistics, in the broad sense of the
term (semiology, discourse analysis, document automation and formal lin-
guistics).
Conclusion
The dispute between Passeron and Gardin is among the most in-depth fran-
cophone intellectual debates in which an archaeologist sought to represent
archaeology. Archaeology has indeed been represented in this debate, but
its own resources were in fact scarcely used, as I hope to have demonstrated.
Thus, neither the concepts, nor the empirical facts considered by archaeolo-
gists, have significantly contributed to this debate. A blind spot – the inclu-
sion of the ontological specificities of archaeological data – is nevertheless
an area which deserves to be researched in greater depth. In the case of the
dispute between Passeron and Gardin, such an in-depth study would be pos-
sible based on their respective ideas of the linguistic properties of the data
analysed, as well as the status of language in the operations of knowledge:
this aspect appears to be crucial for the definition of sociological and archae-
ological data. Regarding the latter, a number of recent publications have in
fact given increased attention to their ontological properties (Olsen et al.
2012, Lucas 2012, Boissinot 2015, Niccolucci et al. 2015). This may be the
way in which francophone archaeology could integrate itself into the con-
ceptual kula of the humanities: or, to borrow Blaise Dufal’s elegant phrase,
to stop being “enfermée dehors” (“locked out”) (Dufal 2010).
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